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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the fall of the socialist system, Central European1 economies underwent  
a strong industrial crisis, which was particularly damaging to concentrated 
spaces of mining, heavy industry and mass production. Referred to as Old 
Industrial Regions (OIRs) or sometimes Old Industrial Areas in regional studies 
(cf. Steiner, 1985, 2003; Cooke, 1995; Boschma and Lambooy, 1999), these 
regions experienced widespread economic, social and environmental degrada-
tion, and were widely considered the losers of transition processes with pros-
pects of long-term stagnation (Gorzelak, 1998). The failure of socialist econo-
mies was strongly associated with images of industrial dereliction and decay; 
criticisms of the planning system often focused on industrial policy as a central 
dilemma (e.g. Jánossy, 1969; Kornai, 1980; Winiecki, 1986), and some of the 
early democratic movements also included an environmentalist, anti-industrial 
element. 
If we examine the industrial crisis from a comparative perspective, we can 
find that many of the symptoms which surfaced in post-socialist OIRs had clear 
antecedents in Western European examples from the 1970s and 1980s, just as 
the industrialisation of the 1950s and 1960s was comparable to similar, although 
much less brutal western development campaigns such as in the Italian Mezzogi-
orno or France’s rural peripheries. Furthermore, it is also possible to speak of 
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similarities in the commonly cited causes of decline: monofunctional regional 
economies, lagging innovation and institutional sclerosis (or ‘institutional, 
technological and political lock-in’) were no strangers to socialist industrial 
regions; rather, the differences manifested themselves in the greater geographi-
cal scope and severity of the resulting problems.  
 
 
Fig. 1. The industrial landscape of post-socialist Central Europe 
Legend: 1 – major Old Industrial Region, 2 – metropolitan region with some OIR characteristics,  
3 – traditional industrial core, 4 – new manufacturing zone, 5–6 – highest and lowest levels of 
industrial employment (PL, CZ, SK, HU, SI, RO and BG, 2004) 
Source: 5–6 based on Eurostat 
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Even when we factor in early policy responses after 1989, there are clear 
parallels: focus on environmental cleanup, infrastructural projects and decreas-
ing the social costs of transformation. These steps are consistent with the typical 
behaviour in western economies (see Ex Post Evaluation of 1994–1999 Objec-
tive 2 Programmes, 2003), and went hand-in-hand with the associated dilemmas 
of potentially sacrificing economic growth for the postponement of substantial 
restructuring efforts (Audretsch et al., 2000). In the end, the restructuring 
process was predominantly market- instead of policy-driven, with increased 
regional differentiation as the ultimate outcome.  
OIRs are spread over Central European space. The most extensive examples 
are found within the boundaries of the Łódź–Erfurt–Budapest ‘triangle’, the 
heartland of 19th century industrialisation which was still a dominant element in 
the early 1970s, as well as some other centres scattered across the board (Košice 
and the polycentric Borsod industrial region, Southern Transylvania and the Jiu 
valley etc.). The new industrial development of Central Europe mostly took 
place in a new growth zone ranging from Western and Central Transdanubia in 
Hungary to Upper Silesia, Poland: this area encompasses the highest levels of 
industrial employment, while the eastern peripheries of the EU-27 are still 
characterised by a low industrialisation level (figure 1). 
This paper aims to assess the highly variable ways Old Industrial Regions 
have reinvented themselves in the new economic geographies of post-socialist, 
and according to some, post-transition Central Europe. In spite of gloomy 
predictions with regards to their future, there are numerous examples of regions 
where the restructuring process, if not painless, was mostly successful; the 
solutions, however, were far from uniform. Strategies to scope with an adverse 
economic, social and environmental heritage started with similar objectives 
across post-socialist OIRs, but soon evolved into divergent patterns of adapta-
tion, as elaborated in section 2. Although local and regional factors make for  
a unique set of circumstances in each case, it is possible to identify three main 
ways to look at the restructuring process, which in turn can be divided into more 
positive and more negative outcomes. Some OIRs can be considered purer 
representatives of these patterns; others, especially large, complex regions, show 
a more heterogeneous picture.  
The role of industrial growth in regional performance is another issue to con-
sider. Although tertiary development and urban economies are cited as the pre-
eminent source of prosperity in the modern world, ‘industrial production and 
employment remain central to national and regional well-being’ in the global 
context (Turnock, 2001, p. 849) as well as in Central Europe, where they are an 
even more significant dynamising force. However, as section 3. discusses, the 
manifestation of this force is different in central, intermediate and peripheral 
region types, and has far-reaching consequences for the elaboration of regional 
policies.  
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2. FORMS OF ADAPTATION IN OLD INDUSTRIAL REGIONS 
Restructuring efforts in Central European OIRs initially focused on the renewal 
of old industries through attracting capital, support for small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), diversification into new industrial branches and company 
structures, as well as physical infrastructure-building and environmental 
cleanup. These goals are common to almost all regions hit by industrial decline, 
and in fact show strong continuity with the adjustment strategies proposed in the 
late socialist period. It is from the mid-1990s that we are seeing the major 
divergence of development trajectories. There are examples of adaptation where 
the key to success was the innovative restructuring of traditional branches; 
elsewhere, it was embracing service-based growth (although the results here are 
somewhat ambigious) or new types of industry. There are of course also failures 
– urban centres and regions which have been marginalised through a destructive 
loss of industry or long stagnation with deficient entrepreneurship. 
With the breakdown of national planning systems after the dissolution of the 
socialist system, much of the evolution was spontaneous, based on market 
processes and several path-dependent factors. In some cases, regional actors 
were successful in formulating workable strategies from the mid-1990s and 
onwards (previous initiatives often remained on paper). Planning under the aegis 
of EU-integration became instrumental in encouraging both central governments 
and sub-national elites to rethink their positions and goals; it also provided 
increasing funds to assist the process. 
Adaptation patterns, or strategies, may be grouped into three distinct types, 
with possible positive and negative outcomes (table 1). Transformation is of 
course a complex process, where public and private initiatives, colluding or 
colliding interests, external forces and endogenous resources come into play; 
therefore, most regions show the influence of all three to various extents – but 
most often, one or two become distinct, or sometimes even dominant. Adapta-
tion patterns are also future images – their content may be judged very differ-
ently. De-industrialisation is a classic example, as it is seen both as a promise of 
modernity (post-industrial development) and as a threat (the disappearance of  
a region’s economic base).  
 
Table 1. Successful and unsuccessful adaptation patterns 
 
Pattern type a. Successful outcome b. Unsuccessful outcome 
I. + Innovative restructuring – Peripheral reintegration 
II. + Service economy – Industrial collapse 
III. + Diversification – Sustenance economy 
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The first pattern is linked to the reconstruction or renewal of the industrial 
base. The desired effect is innovative restructuring in the Schumpeterian sense 
through creative destruction (the market-driven ‘natural selection’ of industrial 
enterprises) and adaptive restructuring (the ability of enterprises to benefit from 
process innovation2); essentially, a rejuvenated and competitive industry which 
can withstand rivalry on the global scale. Social costs (structural and frictional 
unemployment) are initially high, but they are eventually offset by jobs created 
in industry and services. As a benefit to the long-term growth potential of the 
region, much of the technical know-how and human potential is retained in this 
scenario. It must be emphasised that development is still driven by exogenous 
factors, which may lead to a certain level of dependence. 
In contrast with the successful outcome is peripheral reintegration. In this 
case, the monostructure or its majority survives, as do its deficiencies. It can be 
integrated into the global economy by keeping down production costs, but with 
low innovation and retaining its outdated production and institutional structure, 
it can only do so as a part of the periphery. Long-term results are a postpone-
ment of more serious trouble, since there is no guarantee that the same structural 
problems will not resurface in the future, or changes in the world market will not 
lead to more serious upheaval. Social costs are medium to high, since labour 
costs cannot be globally competitive, and unemployment remains significant. 
Know-how and human potential does not disappear, but a decline in quality is 
probable – making later regeneration efforts more challenging. 
The second pattern is the loss of industry as a driving force behind regional 
economic growth. The positive outcome is a service economy conforming to the 
ideal of post-industrial society. Conscious tertiarisation is not usually mentioned 
as a possibility in works discussing industrial restructuring (Cooke, 1995; 
Horváth, 1998; Boschma and Lambooy, 1999; Steiner, 1985, 2003); likely 
because if the strategy is successful, the region’s growth is subsequently 
influenced by non-industrial factors. On the other hand, it crops up frequently in 
urban studies, as the physical reconfiguration of the abandoned industrial 
environment is a common challenge in the current urban renaissance; a host of 
new functions for abandoned real estate is possible, and the reimagined Indus-
trial landscape may even become a valued asset. 
A significant turnaround like moving from industry- to service-based econ-
omy is of course hard to undertake. There are high social costs early on, which 
must be treated through retirement packages, retraining and other schemes. 
Monofunctional industrial regions may lack the diversity of potential growth 
factors (e.g. culture, education and developed urban services) to succeed at 
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 Szalavetz (2003) points out that mature branches, while they no longer generate new innovations, 
are capable of adapting the innovative practices of other branches (e.g. more capital-intensive 
production, efficient management solutions). 
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service-based regeneration. Successful western examples exist (e.g. the textile 
town Leeds, which has reinvented itself as a university hub with 50,000 stu-
dents), but in Central Europe, results have so far been mixed. The case of the 
Mecsek Old Industrial Region in Southern Transdanubia, Hungary, should serve 
as a good example, as well as a cautionary note. With the downsising and later 
liquidation of coal and uranium mining, the regional centre, Pécs has adopted 
various development strategies oriented at service-based growth; however, 
attempts to create a ‘market city’ failed due to civil war in Yugoslavia and weak 
cross-border links, while education- and culture-led regeneration, the most 
recent manifestation of which is the 2010 European Capital of Culture project, 
could only alleviate economic stagnation, not counteract it. In the satellite town 
of Komló (a product of 1950s industrialisation), the same processes have 
resulted in a collapse of industry with economic hardship and social disintegra-
tion: Pécs at least had a strong university with 35,000 students and a cultural life 
that could stabilise the economy; Komló had none of that and suffered the 
consequences. It appears that outside of central regions, service-based growth 
(especially if it is based on non-tradeable services) is still inadequate to drive  
a complex regional economy, and in former monofunctional industrial areas, its 
possibilities are strongly limited. 
The negative outcome of the pattern is industrial collapse. While the com-
mon interpretation of ‘de-industrialisation’ suggests modernisation, in Central 
Europe’s crisis areas, another form, the loss of industry with no replacement is 
also visible. Deep depression follows, where social costs are tremendous, and 
due to long-term unemployment and consequent de-skilling, even the possibil-
ity of reindustrialisation becomes uncertain.3 As typical of Central European 
crisis regions, local municipalities may become the primary employers. 
Industrial collapse is generally coupled with a sustenance economy: tertiary 
employment is high, but not in a healthy way.4 These regions need strong 
public intervention to be regenerated; first and foremost by social/labour-
market reintegration measures.  
Diversification involves the development of a vigorous SME sphere to re-
place or complement the old monostructure: new industries, but also services. As 
a concept, it is built on the understanding that smaller, more adaptive entrepre-
neurial structures may be better at competition, and may utilise regional re-
sources more efficiently. Dismembering large companies by function and 
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 The author’s interviews with entrepreneurs and decision-makers in two Hungarian OIRs have 
drawn attention to the problem that the main impediment before new industrial investment is no 
longer the lack of available capital or infrastructure, but the scarcity of adequate local/regional 
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4
 For a long time, Hungary’s poorest counties led the rankings in the share of tertiary employment; 
similar phenomena may be seen in other post-socialist countries. 
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individual privatisation is a potential solution – some surviving satellites may 
continue to be active in industry, while others can become the basis for an 
emerging business services sector. Diversification is not a sectoral solution: it 
cannot hope to solve the troubles of problem industries. What it can encourage is 
higher institutional flexibility and the gradual easing of lock-in effects. The 
social costs of diversification are low to medium, since jobs are transferred into 
alternate activities, although certain groups, primarily deprived ones, may 
experience adverse consequences during the process. Knowledge and skills also 
remain relatively intact. Diversification is a common element of restructuring 
scenarios and was particularly relevant in the early transition period; the 
majority of the successful intermediate regions whose economy is still industry-
based show a strong presence of this pattern. 
The negative outcome of the third pattern is the development of a sustenance 
economy. The distinction is subtle but important: in this case, SMEs are only 
preferred because the alternatives are much worse: enterprises are not instru-
ments of growth or competitiveness; merely existing as domestic or collective 
survival mechanisms whose aim is simple self-sustenance. While the owners of 
these SMEs are technically ‘entrepreneurs’, what they lack is precisely entrepre-
neurship: neither knowledge, nor capital or trust exist; activities produce little 
added value and are weak against external threats. Stagnation results and there 
are high social costs – maybe not in the form of unemployment, but economic 
stagnation and social dysfunctions such as high mortality, crime etc. Peripheral 
industrial regions often experienced the negative effects of this scenario; it is 
questionable how much of an asset deficient entrepreneurship can be for future 
growth: likely, thorough institutional and even social changes are needed to turn 
them into competitive and innovative entities. 
3. THE ROLE OF INDUSTRY UNDER THE NEW SPATIAL DIFFERENTIATION 
In addition to considering the divergent forms of adaptation among Old Indus-
trial regions, the significance of industry in the wider economic context also 
needs to be addressed. Today, industry plays a role all over Central Europe, but 
this role is not uniform. When we examine industry’s significance in Central 
European economies, we have to discriminate on the basis of space, and con-
sider the questions of development and modernisation in the regional context. 
Looking at regional GDP rankings across Central Europe, it is visible that the 
highest spots are taken by both service- and industry-dominated regions, and 
these mostly separate into distinct categories (figure 2). While the most prosper-
ous positions belong to service-based central regions, the others owe most of 
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their current rank to their manufacturing role. Even a number of OIRs are 
present on the list: Közép-Dunántúl (Central Transdanubia), Moravskoslezsko 
(Moravian Silesia), Śląskie (Upper Silesia) and Pomorskie (Pomerania). 
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Fig. 2. The top 20 Central European regions ranked by per capita GDP  
(2004, PPP, % of EU-27 average) 
Note: White columns indicate service-based central regions; black columns indicate intermediate 
regions, whose growth is primarily based on manufacturing 
Source: based on data from Eurostat 
 
Therefore, while the dominant phenomenon of the post-socialist economic 
landscape has been an increasing share of the tertiary sector, only some regions 
can function well as genuinely ‘post-industrial’ economies. Elsewhere, it is still 
industrial investment which serves as the main vehicle of spatial differentiation. 
Accordingly, we may distinguish central, intermediate and peripheral regions, all 
three with a different set of circumstances and needs. Planning and public policy 
should take these differences into account, and formulate different strategies for 
distinct region types instead of falling back on uniform growth formulas which 
are typically based on the preferences and needs of national centres.5 OIRs are 
typically intermediate or peripheral regions, but some of their issues are also 
applicable to central ones. 
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 As an example, the main documents of Hungarian development policy neglect to make mention 
of industry; outside a few generic remarks, the word is only used in reference to encouraging 
traditional crafts as an instrument of rural development in backwards areas; itself a highly dubious 
idea. 
  Divergent Patterns of Adaptation among Central European Old Industrial Regions 153 
Central regions (national capitals), although not often thought of as indus-
trial, were major manufacturing hubs in the socialist period, preferred by 
economic development policy.6 During transformation, several of their compa-
nies closed down, and their place was taken by services: they became efficient 
post-industrial economies. The most innovative service activities, especially 
business services, are strongly concentrated here, as are administrative/political 
functions, R&D and higher education. This does not mean development lacks an 
industrial component: some of the highest value added branches, such as 
pharmaceuticals, precision machinery and optics, are still often located in central 
regions. Finally, even when manufacturing is found in intermediate regions, 
corporate headquarters or branch offices are often maintained elsewhere – out of 
country or in capital cities.  
Central regions have only had to face some of the problems of industrial 
restructuring. In their case, the transformation was rapid and mostly successful, 
with high short-term unemployment and a legacy of abandoned sites (the 
‘intermediate zone’ of Budapest is a prime example – cf. Barta et al., 2006). The 
spaces of former industry are extensive elements of the urban fabric; facing 
problems of dereliction, pollution, crime and segregation etc. They have started 
to see numerous forms of reuse in recent years, and are increasingly considered 
worthy of conservation as an element of cultural heritage (Graham et al., 2000). 
Industry continues to be a strong dynamising force in intermediate regions – 
regions with an average urbanisation level but without the problems of peripher-
ies. They benefit from service-based growth, but available evidence suggests 
that this in itself is insufficient for prosperity, and a mixture of industrial and 
tertiary activities is optimal. Western border regions are typically mentioned as 
winners of transition; the growth of automotive and machine industry in the 
Vienna–Gyır–Bratislava trans-border area is just one example (Grosz, 2006). 
On the other hand, they are not the only ones to belong to the category. OIRs 
which have been successful in their adaptation by diversification or the innova-
tive restructuring of traditional branches start to become very strong contenders 
even if they do not benefit from an ideal geographic position. Their main 
strength is an established industrial millieu, with skilled workforce, technical 
education and supporting institutions.  
The role of these factors is becoming more and more important as pools of 
skilled labour are depleted across Central Europe and competition for employees 
in the previously preferred western border areas drives up wages. Adaptation in 
Upper Silesia, which has been based on a mixture of revitalising the ailing coal-
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 In 1971, Budapest accounted for 34% of the national industrial employment and 23% of 
investments. Sofia City (16%) and Bucharest (16%) were also major employment concentrations 
in this period. 
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and-steel industries,7 diversifying into new branches (especially automotive 
industry) and exploiting the Katowice conurbation’s growing metropolitan 
functions, has been largely based on turning these strongly path-dependent 
factors from liabilities into assets (Klasik and Heffner, 2001; Geisler et al., 
2005), although symptoms of peripheral reintegration are also apparent, and may 
represent a future threat. 
Intermediate regions are perhaps in the strongest need of comprehensive 
industrial policies. Although their present situation is favourable, they need to 
undertake significiant industrial upgrading to counteract sliding towards periph-
eral reintegration by encouraging stronger reinvestment and embeddedness. The 
current source of competitiveness in intermediate regions is predominantly 
neofordist manufacturing activity with low to moderate added value; it is vital 
that they start adjusting towards more extensive knowledge-using, and in the 
longer term, knowledge producing activities (Lengyel, 2003). Institution-
building within networks (supply chains, but also education and training, 
knowledge transfer, chambers of commerce etc.), the support of concentrated 
economic development units such as industrial estates and technology parks, as 
well as the development of business services is the best area of public interven-
tion. The best actors to undertake this task is regionally established agencies, 
which need empowerment and financial means to facilitate the upgrading 
process. The top-down, centralised philosophy of planning in Central Europe 
still poses problems in this field. 
Traditional and new peripheral regions are still coping with inherited and 
new backwardness. They were either under-industrialised in the past, or their 
previous capacities have been eroded so strongly that they can be considered 
lost. Most of the former are rural and/or eastern border areas, whose traditional 
light and food industries suffered during transition, and are losing further ground 
to global competitors. A large share of Old Industrial Regions is found in the 
latter category. In them, de-industrialisation was not counteracted by competitive 
tertiary growth, and they remain in various stages of stagnation or underdevel-
opment – characterised by collapsed industries, sustenance economies and 
struggling traditional branches. The result is a low level equilibrium trap, which, 
as per Rosenstein-Rodan and Hirschman, can be  
 
[...] thought of as a massive coordination failure: several investments do not occur simply because 
other complementary investments are not made, and similarly, these latter investments are not 
forthcoming simply because the former are missing (Szalavetz, 2003, p. 180). 
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 After more than a decade of decline, coal mining in the region has experienced some resurgence; 
Polish coal production accounted for approximately one half of the enlarged European Union’s 
output in 2004, and it was mainly being mined in Upper Silesia (Daviet, 2004); meanwhile, 
steelmaking is increasingly being integrated into global production networks with growing product 
sophistication and an emerging cluster formation process. 
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Peripheral regions need public intervention to re-industrialise, and these 
measures must be accompanied by social regeneration – first and foremost to 
reduce inactivity. Even semi-peripheral branches can be useful in retaining or 
developing the knowledge and social fabric of the region. With the increasing 
scarcity of labour in Central European states, even peripheral regions can be 
realistically considered locales for Foreign Direct Investment – if they have the 
manpower, and a certain level of accessibility. Some eastern border areas have 
been successful in this respect: traditional light industry (textiles) increasingly 
serving the needs of international supplier networks has experienced new growth 
in Eastern Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Transcarpathia, Ukraine (Kalan-
taridis et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2005); and there is also a sort of industrial 
renaissance along the Ukrainian-Hungarian border, where a number of manufac-
turing and assembly units, primarily car parts and electronics producers, have 
chosen to locate. What planning has to take into account; however, is not just re-
industrialisation, but also its sustainability. As cost advantages are further 
eroded, peripheries must diversify into higher value added activities to withstand 
European and global competition. 
4. DISCUSSION 
The future development of Old Industrial Regions in Central Europe poses  
a number of challenging dilemmas. In the preceding decade, a number of OIRs 
have belied pessimistic suggestions and joined the ranks of growth regions 
through a combination of different adaptation patterns: they are not national 
leaders, but occupy favourable positions in the landscape of macroregional 
competition. Still, others are lagging behind or have been swept to the peripher-
ies; their redevelopment remains a question to be answered by regional policy. 
But even successfully restructured regions must continually try to improve 
their positions. To a large extent, their success is by virtue of positive path-
dependent factors which have in turn encouraged investment capital to consider 
them as good location choices. It is easy to foresee the time when this will no 
longer be adequate; a more conscious approach is going to be needed to identify 
and bolster the productive environment in a sustainable manner. As Central 
European industry is being ever more deeply integrated into the wider European 
economic networks, it must prepare for the post-transition period by constant 
upgrading. As ‘post-socialism’ gives way to ‘post-transition’, and the distinctive 
features Central European space start to merge into western structures, losing 
their separateness, the adoption of new institutional setups and spatial manage-
ment solutions should also be considered.  
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What can states and regions do to favourably influence their industrial devel-
opment and treat the remaining problems of Old Industrial Regions? First, they 
have to recognise how different regions require different forms of industrial 
policy. But they also have to acknowledge their limitations. Policy should 
provide assistance in institution-building and prepare the ground for investments 
which will come from the private sector if the appropriate conditions are present. 
But to be efficient, this also requires a degree of administrative decentralisation, 
especially in the realm of economic policy. Excessive centralisation may mean 
squandered opportunities for regions, since if they cannot make meaningful 
decisions and have the financial instruments to put them into effect, they will be 
unable to live up to the bottom-up development potential only they can exploit. 
The same thing means needless administrative burden for central bureaucracies, 
who are now overwhelmed by the micromanagement of individual tenders 
(Horváth, 2007). On the other hand, where the cooperation of central and 
regional elites could create a balance of power between top-down and bottom-up 
development concerns, the results have been more successful. These challenges 
are still to be answered by most Central European planning systems. 
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